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RECKLESS ABANDON:
THE SHADOW OF MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AND
A PATH FORWARD
MARGARET TARKINGTON†
INTRODUCTION
In August 2016, the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”)
Board of Governors approved Model Rule of Professional Conduct
(“MRPC”) 8.4(g) as a model for state adoption. The Rule makes it
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in “harassment or
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
marital status or socioeconomic status.”1 Curbing harassment
and discrimination is a critically important goal. However, the
actual Rule as promulgated reaches far beyond prohibiting
sexual harassment and unlawful discrimination. Instead the
comments to the Rule define discrimination and harassment
broadly to prohibit speech2 that “manifests bias or prejudice” or is
“derogatory or demeaning” on the aforementioned bases.3 Swept
within the Rule’s apparent reach is speech regarding many of
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1
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
2
The Model Rule uses the term “verbal . . . conduct”—but verbal conduct is
speech. See id., cmt. 3.
3
Id.
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“the major public issues of our time” that divide our country.4
Further, the Rule expressly applies to settings such as
Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) courses, bar functions, and
social activities in connection with the practice of law;5 indeed
the ABA’s Report indicates it was intended to reach “lobbyists”
and “settings [ ]such as law schools.”6
Despite public and scholarly criticism of the Rule voicing
concerns that it will work to undermine lawyers’ First
Amendment rights,7 the Rule itself is likely to have very little
actual effect on lawyers’ rights—precisely because many states
are declining to adopt it, some due to opinions from their
respective attorneys general that the Rule unconstitutionally
infringes on lawyers’ First Amendment rights.8
Since its
approval in 2016 only two states, Vermont and New Mexico, have
adopted Rule 8.4(g) as promulgated by the ABA.9 Maine and

4

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964). See also MARGARET
TARKINGTON, VOICE OF JUSTICE: RECLAIMING THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF
LAWYERS 259–60 (2018) (describing how Model Rule 8.4(g) covers speech regarding
public issues).
5
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) & cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting
with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the
practice of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating
in bar association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.”
(emphasis added)).
6
Myles V. Lynk, Report to the House of Delegates, 2016 A.B.A. STANDING COMM.
ON ETHICS & PRO. RESP. 2 [hereinafter ABA REPORT 109].
7
See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, A Speech Code for Lawyers, Banning Viewpoints that
Express ‘Bias,’ Including in Law-Related Social Activities, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Aug.
10,
2016,
8:53
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speechcode-for-lawyers-banning-viewpoints-that-express-bias-including-in-law-relatedsocial-activities-2/; David French, A Speech Code for Lawyers, NAT’L REV.: LAW AND
THE COURTS (Aug. 11, 2016, 7:46 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/08/freespeech-lawyers-american-bar-association-model-rules-professional-conduct/
[https://perma.cc/YML2-GBL2]; Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts
Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 258 (2017); Andrew F.
Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g):
Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J.
LEGAL PRO. 201, 249 (2017); Keith Swisher & Eugene Volokh, Point-Counterpoint: A
Speech Code for Lawyers?, 101 JUDICATURE 70, 74 (2017) (statement of Eugene
Volokh); George W. Dent, Jr., Model Rule 8.4(g): Blatantly Unconstitutional and
Blatantly Political, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 135, 135 (2018); Jack
Park, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): An Exercise in Coercing Virtue?, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 267,
274 (2019).
8
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
9
VT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017); N.M. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
16-804(G) (2019).
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New Hampshire adopted comparable rules in 2019, but both
states made substantial and important changes to the Rule—
including discarding entirely the ABA’s definition of
discrimination—to protect lawyers’ First Amendment rights.10
Despite the overarching trend of states in rejecting Model
Rule 8.4(g) in view of its potential infringement on lawyers’ First
Amendment rights, there is a perilous and lasting threat to those
rights that has arisen as a byproduct of the ABA’s promulgation
of 8.4(g). The Model Rule has cast an ominous shadow on legal
scholarship and commentary addressing the recognition and
protection of lawyers’ First Amendment rights. This shadow of
Model Rule 8.4(g) is far more likely to undermine lawyers’ rights
in the long run than the Rule itself. Indeed, the shadow has
nothing to do with interpretations, enforcement, or adoption of
Model Rule 8.4(g). It has nothing to do with discrimination or
harassment or with either prohibiting or protecting offensive
speech.
Instead, the shadow is the generation of legal
scholarship and commentary that discards altogether the First
Amendment rights of lawyers to shore up the purported
constitutionality of Model Rule 8.4(g).
The abandonment of lawyers’ First Amendment rights in
prominent scholarship and Formal Ethics Opinions from the
ABA promises to have far reaching consequences in a manifold of
disciplinary contexts where attorneys rely on the protective
shield of the First Amendment to avoid discipline for speech,
association, assembly, or petitioning. Nearly all the work
lawyers do falls within the ambit of the First Amendment. While
this fact seemingly complicates the recognition of lawyers’ First
Amendment rights,11 protecting those rights is essential to
protecting the system of justice and the role of the lawyer
therein.
Defenders of the current Model Rule 8.4(g) appear oblivious
to the value of the First Amendment in protecting lawyers from
regulation promulgated by the ABA or enforced by state bars and
judiciaries. Yet political wheels turn and political power changes
hands. It is incredibly short-sighted to advocate for abandoning
First Amendment protection for lawyers on the theory that we
can just trust regulators.
Our experiences over the past
10
See ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019); N.H. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) & Sup. Ct. cmt. (2019).
11
See Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 ARK. L.
REV. 687, 694–95 (1997); TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 20.
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century—through the civil rights movement, the labor
movement, two Red scares, post-9/11 fear of terrorism, and antiimmigration policies12—work together to demonstrate the
profound importance of protecting lawyers’ First Amendment
rights. It is only through lawyer speech, association with clients,
and petitioning that the judicial power is invoked, and that client
life, liberty, and property are protected. If regulators can silence
the voice of lawyers, they can silence justice itself.
If the only available options were to either throw out Model
Rule 8.4(g) or to throw out the First Amendment, the right
answer under our system of government is clear. The First
Amendment stays. But those are not the only options. Maine’s
and New Hampshire’s significant alterations of the Rule
demonstrate
that
drafting
a
constitutionally
sound
antidiscrimination rule is attainable. By pushing for adoption of
Model Rule 8.4(g), the ABA and its defenders are stoking a
culture war and forcing people to choose sides in a false
dichotomy between antidiscrimination and the First Amendment.
Proponents of antiharassment and antidiscrimination should
stop defending Model Rule 8.4(g) as promulgated. Instead, the
ABA needs to recall Rule 8.4(g) and promulgate a new rule that
is constitutionally sound. Yet rather than take this path, in July
2020, the ABA potentially escalated matters by issuing a Formal
Ethics Opinion that doubled-down on the validity of the
promulgated Model Rule 8.4(g), citing to the tragic murder of
George Floyd and the “unprecedented social awareness generated
by it[,]” and asserting that “[e]nforcement of Rule 8.4(g)
is . . . critical.”13
The fact that many states already have some
antidiscrimination language in their existing rules of
professional conduct indicates that states do not object to the
principles of equality underlying Model Rule 8.4(g).14 Rather, it
is the overbreadth of Model Rule 8.4(g) and its encroachment into
protected speech and advocacy that is preventing the Rule from
having traction among the states. If the ABA and supporters of
12

See infra notes 27–29, 91–94 and accompanying text.
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 1 & n.3 (2020)
[hereinafter ABA Op. 493].
14
See Kristine A. Kubes, Cara D. Davis & Mary E. Schwind, The Evolution of
Model Rule 8.4 (g): Working to Eliminate Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment in
the
Practice
of
Law,
A.B.A.
(Mar.
12,
2019),
www.americanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_construction
/2019/spring/model-rule-8-4/ [https://perma.cc/4CWM-R4P6].
13
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the Rule would simply own the constitutional deficiencies of
Model Rule 8.4(g) and amend it to fix those deficiencies, the rule
would be far more likely to be adopted—and more likely to stay
law after adoption. Promulgation of a constitutionally sound,
amended rule would in turn work to undermine harassment and
discrimination in adoptive states. Meanwhile the current Rule—
due to its lack of traction—does not actually work to curb
harassment or discrimination, but merely works to inflame the
culture war, dividing liberals and conservatives by forcing people
to choose sides in an unnecessary battle of antidiscrimination
versus the First Amendment.
Legal scholarship and caselaw as to lawyers’ First
Amendment rights have long since been a morass with competing
views as to the appropriate scope of lawyers’ First Amendment
rights. But, as overviewed in Part I, scholarship resoundingly
rejected the constitutional conditions approach, which holds that
attorneys waive their constitutional rights as a condition of the
privilege of practicing law.15 However, as detailed in Part II,
since the promulgation of Model Rule 8.4(g), a growing number of
scholars and Formal Opinions from the ABA embrace the
constitutional conditions approach or otherwise deny lawyers
recourse through the First Amendment.16 This rejection of the
First Amendment in the shadow of defending Model Rule 8.4(g)
has dire potential consequences in many contexts—as the First
Amendment at its core protects the lawyer’s role in the system of
justice and cannot be discarded without undermining justice
itself, as shown in Part III.17 But, as discussed in Part IV, the
Scylla and Charybdis alternatives of either rejecting the First
Amendment or rejecting antidiscrimination is a false
dichotomy—and the ABA and proponents of antidiscrimination
would further their cause far more effectively and
constitutionally by simply amending and proposing a new Model
Rule rather than inflaming an unnecessary culture war.18
I. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REGARDING LAWYERS’ FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS PRIOR TO MODEL RULE 8.4(G)
While the legal landscape regarding lawyers’ First
Amendment rights has long been a morass, the Supreme Court of
15
16
17
18

See infra notes 21–30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 47–51, 64–77 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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the United States has recognized these rights since at least the
1950s, and scholarship largely followed suit.
In the early twentieth century, before the incorporation of
the First Amendment against the states, the constitutional
conditions approach was the primary view. As Justice Cardozo
stated: “Membership in the [B]ar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.”19 In other words, lawyers surrender their First
Amendment rights as a condition of obtaining the privilege to
practice law. The theory is often tied to the lawyer’s oath.
Justice Rehnquist appeared to adopt this approach in his nonmajority Gentile opinion:
When petitioner was admitted to practice law before the Nevada
courts, the oath which he took recited that “I will support, abide
by and follow the Rules of Professional Conduct as are now or
may hereafter be adopted by the Supreme Court . . . .” The
First Amendment does not excuse him from that obligation, nor
should it forbid the discipline imposed upon him by the
Supreme Court of Nevada.20

Despite
Rehnquist’s
apparent
endorsement,
the
constitutional conditions approach has largely been rejected in
legal scholarship prior to the promulgation of Model Rule 8.4(g).
The disappearance of this view was provoked by both the
rejection of constitutional conditions theory in other contexts,21
and the fact that the Supreme Court repeatedly recognized
lawyers’ First Amendment rights during the second Red Scare
and in the civil rights movements. In a series of cases dealing
with state bars that excluded from membership applicants who
were formerly members of the Communist Party, or who refused
to answer questions in that regard, the Supreme Court
ultimately vindicated lawyers’ rights22—expressly rejecting the
constitutional conditions approach in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners of the State of New Mexico, where the Court declared

19

In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84 (N.Y. 1917).
See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1081 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(citation omitted).
21
Outside of the attorney speech context, this doctrine is stated in the reverse as
“unconstitutional conditions” and “holds that government may not grant a benefit on
the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the
government may withhold that benefit altogether.” Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989).
22
See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 274 (1957); Schware v. Bd.
of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 246–47(1957).
20
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that “[c]ertainly the practice of law is not a matter of the State’s
grace.”23
Similarly, after Brown v. Board of Education,24 several
southern states attempted to shut down the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People’s (“NAACP”)
desegregation campaign by redefining prohibited solicitation to
forbid lawyers from speaking to the affected citizens and offering
representation. In NAACP v. Button—a case epitomizing the
importance of lawyers’ First Amendment rights to the integrity of
our justice system—the Supreme Court invalidated state
regulations on lawyers and explicitly recognized lawyers’ First
Amendment rights to association, expression, and petition—even
in the context of practicing law.25 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
invalidated regulations on lawyers as infringing on lawyers’ First
Amendment rights in numerous cases, including Schware,
Konigsberg, Button, Garrison, Bates, In re Primus, In re R.M.J.,
Zauderer, Shapero, Gentile, Velazquez, and Republican Party of
Minnesota.26
In light of this caselaw—and the manifest importance of
protecting lawyers’ First Amendment rights as revealed in the
contexts of punishing lawyers during national Red Scares27 and
in the civil rights28 and labor movements29—the constitutional
conditions theory was overarchingly rejected by legal academia.
Nevertheless, in some state and federal caselaw there exists one
narrow context through which the constitutional conditions
theory managed to remain viable even into the twenty-first
century—and that was in the context of punishing lawyer
derogation of the judiciary.30

23

Schware, 353 U.S. at 238 n.5 (emphasis added).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25
371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963).
26
See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002); Legal
Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548–49 (2001); Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.,
501 U.S. 1030, 1057–58 (1991); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647–49 (1985); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 206–07 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978); Bates v. State
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964);
Button, 371 U.S. at 444; Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 273; Schware, 353 U.S. at 246–47.
27
See, e.g., Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 273–74; Schware, 353 U.S. at 246.
28
See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 442.
29
See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Labor Lawyers and the Ideals of the Mid-Century
Legal Profession 2–3 (2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
30
See Margaret Tarkington, Throwing Out the Baby: The ABA’s Subversion of
Lawyer First Amendment Rights, 24 Texas Rev. L. & Pol. 41, 67–68 (2019).
24
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Legal scholarship has explored other methods to understand
lawyers’ First Amendment rights.
A number of scholars
endorsed various versions of the categorical approach—
contending that lawyers had limited, if any, First Amendment
rights when engaged in the practice of law but had full First
Amendment rights outside of their law practice. Scholars often
came to this conclusion by analogizing attorney First
Amendment rights to other areas of limited First Amendment
protection. For example, Kathleen Sullivan, W. Bradley Wendel,
and Terri Day analogized attorney speech to the limited
protections for public employee speech, government forum
speech, and government-funded speech.31 Working from these
analogies, Kathleen Sullivan concluded that the Supreme Court’s
case law could be understood as providing normal First
Amendment protection when attorneys are speaking “as
participants in ordinary public or commercial discourse on a par
with other speakers in those realms,” but that their free speech
rights are limited—or perhaps lost—when attorneys are
speaking in their role of attorney as “officers of the court” or
“delegates of state power.”32
Other scholars, including Erwin Chemerinsky,33 Renee
Newman Knake,34 Carol Rice Andrews,35 Monroe Freedman and
Janet Starwood,36 argued that regular First Amendment
doctrines applied to lawyer regulation and discipline. This
approach is supported by a number of Supreme Court cases when
the Court applies normal First Amendment principles to lawyer

31

See Terri R. Day, Speak No Evil: Legal Ethics v. the First Amendment, 32 J.
LEGAL PRO. 161, 187–90 (2008) (analogizing attorney speech to public employee
speech); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal
Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
569, 585–87 (1998) (analogizing attorney speech to public employees, governmentfunded speech, and speech in a non-public forum); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech
for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 375–81 (2001) (same).
32
Sullivan, supra note 31, at 569, 584.
33
Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under
the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L. J. 859, 863–67 (1998).
34
See Renee Newman Knake, Legal Information, the Consumer Law Market,
and the First Amendment, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2843, 2844–45 (2014).
35
Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 690 (1999); Carol
Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amendment Challenge,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 776–78 (2000).
36
Monroe H. Freedman & Janet Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of
Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum,
29 STAN. L. REV. 607, 617 (1977).
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regulation. For example, in the advertising context, the Supreme
Court has applied the Central Hudson commercial speech line of
cases to attorney regulation of advertising.37 Although the state
interests and the regulations themselves may involve interests
specific to attorneys, the analysis the Court used to test the
constitutionality of the restriction, along with the level of
scrutiny employed, are the same as that used for regulation of
any other service provider or regulated industry. Further, in
both Republican Party of Minnesota v. White38 and WilliamsYulee v. Florida Bar39 the Court applied strict scrutiny—the
normal level for restrictions on political speech—in analyzing the
constitutionality of restrictions on speech of judicial candidates.
More broadly, in its June 2018 opinion, National Institute of
Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, the Supreme Court flatly
rejected the argument that “professional speech”—speech made
by professionals while acting as professionals—was subject to a
lower level of scrutiny than exists under normal First
Amendment doctrines.40 The Court, albeit by a 5–4 majority,
explained that its prior precedents had “not recognized
‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech” subject to
lower scrutiny and that “[s]peech is not unprotected merely
because it is uttered by ‘professionals.’ ”41 Consequently, the
Court applied strict scrutiny, employing “ordinary First
Amendment principles” governing content-based regulations.42
Although the Becerra opinion dealt with regulations in the
medical profession, the Court relied heavily on cases dealing with
attorney First Amendment rights.43
As I have previously contended, the use of normal First
Amendment doctrines for analyzing lawyer regulations has its

37
See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623–24 (1995); Shapero v.
Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 637–44 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203–06 (1982); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977).
38
536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).
39
575 U.S. 433, 442–44 (2015).
40
138 S.Ct. 2361, 2371–72 (2018).
41
Id.
42
Id. at 2375.
43
See, e.g., id. at 2372–74 (discussing and citing to cases adjudicating the First
Amendment rights of lawyers, including Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626 (1985), Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229
(2010), Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963), In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), and Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)).
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limitations because those doctrines are not attuned to protecting
the integrity of the justice system. They do not accurately
identify either what speech must be protected so lawyers can
fulfill their role in the justice system or what speech can, or
should, be forbidden to protect the proper functioning of the
justice system.44
Consequently, I have advocated the access to justice theory,
which attunes the First Amendment rights of lawyers to the role
of the lawyer in the justice system.45 This approach does not
result in a forfeiture of lawyers’ First Amendment rights either
entirely, as in the constitutional conditions approach, or in the
practice of law, as in the categorical approach. Instead, under
the access to justice theory, the core of attorney First
Amendment rights is the protection of attorney speech,
association, and petitioning that provides access to law and to
legal processes—thus protecting the work of lawyers—paid or
not, transactional or litigation, or civil, administrative, or
criminal—that serves to invoke or avoid the power of government
in securing individual or collective life, liberty, or property. The
First Amendment also protects the attorney’s role in enabling
and invoking judicial and administrative power as lawyers
institute cases and controversies before such bodies. The First
Amendment protects the ability of the lawyer to play a major role
in checking governmental power, as well as institutional and
economic power.
The access to justice theory also recognizes that there are
restrictions on attorney speech that are essential to preserve the
integrity of the justice system and the role of the lawyer therein.
Thus, the First Amendment does not protect from discipline
attorney speech that would frustrate or undermine the integrity
of court processes, the constitutional and legal rights of case
44

Frederick Schauer relies on this fact in arguing that the “speech of law”
should thus properly remain “unencumbered by either the doctrine or the discourse
of the First Amendment.” Schauer, supra note 11, at 691. Although Schauer
correctly diagnoses one of the puzzles surrounding recognition of attorney First
Amendment rights—that nearly all regulations on attorneys can be couched as
regulations on attorney speech—his solution is misplaced. Simply by attuning
lawyers’ First Amendment rights to their role in the justice system, the legitimate
concerns that Schauer raises—of either the invalidation of regulations essential to
justice or dilution of the First Amendment itself—can be avoided. See TARKINGTON,
supra note 4, at 19–22, 26.
45
Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney
Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 27, 36, 42–44 (2011); TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at
90–92.
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participants (including the right to jury trial, the presumption of
innocence, the right to counsel), or the core fiduciary duties owed
to clients.46
II. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND COMMENTARY IN THE SHADOW OF
MODEL RULE 8.4(G)
Although the constitutional conditions theory long ago lost
its sway in legal academia, it has enjoyed a recent resurgence
since the promulgation of Model Rule 8.4(g). This resurgence
begins with the Standing Committee that drafted and adopted
Model Rule 8.4(g). Myles Lynk, the Chair of that Committee,
explained to the Committee that “lawyers have always been
subject to ethics rules that impinge on what otherwise would be
Lynk then listed
their Frist [sic] Amendment rights.”47
examples, such as rules regarding confidentiality and pretrial
publicity, and concluded that, consequently, the Rule “does not
violate a lawyer’s First Amendment rights.”48 It appears from
Lynk’s summation, that lawyers, as a condition of obtaining their
license to practice law, have renounced their First Amendment
objections to rules of professional conduct.
Other advocates of Model Rule 8.4(g) have followed suit.
Stephen Gillers in his article offering to be “A Guide for State
Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g),” addresses and dismisses
the First Amendment concerns raised by Rule 8.4(g) by simply
arguing that “we should recognize that even today the Model
Rules contain provisions limiting speech,” providing similar
examples to those offered by Lynk.49 Purportedly, the existence
of any other rules that appear to limit lawyer speech
demonstrates that lawyers lack First Amendment protection
against the Model Rules, including Model Rule 8.4(g) as
promulgated. Similarly, L. Ali Khan contends that Model Rule

46
See generally TARKINGTON, supra note 4, chs. 5–14 (explaining the contours of
the access to justice theory both generally and as applied in specific contexts,
including association with clients, client counseling, invoking law and legal
processes, impugning judicial integrity, securing constitutional criminal protections,
pretrial publicity, and attorney civility, harassment and discrimination).
47
Halaby & Long, supra note 7, at 250 (emphasis added) (excerpting First
Amendment analysis of the proposed rule presented by Myles Lynk to the
Committee).
48
Id.
49
Stephen Gillers, A Rule To Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A
Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195,
234–35 (2017).
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8.4(g) does not “diminish” First Amendment rights of speech,
religion, and association any more than other rules, explaining
that “[i]t is a well-established rule in American jurisprudence
that lawyers surrender some (not all) of their First Amendment
rights when they choose to practice law.”50 And although Khan
indicates that there is some limit on the bar’s power to regulate
by saying that “not all” First Amendment rights are surrendered,
he does not explain what rights are surrendered and what rights
are not or what a principled basis would be for knowing which
rights are effected.
Dennis Rendleman embraces the constitutional conditions
approach directly, stating that “[l]awyers do, indeed, agree to
limit the exercise of some First Amendment rights for the
privilege of practicing law.”51 Like Link, Gillers, and Kahn,
Rendleman lists other rules of professional conduct that regulate
lawyer speech as proof of his point, and concludes: “These are
just a few examples of restrictions on a lawyer’s First
Amendment ‘rights’ when practicing law.”52 The use of ironic
quotation marks around the word “rights” underscores
Rendleman’s position that lawyers simply lack First Amendment
rights vis-à-vis professional regulation.
Robert Weiner argued that to the extent Rule 8.4(g) covers
speech,53 it does not violate the First Amendment because the
speech regulated falls into one of three categories. The first
category is speech made in the lawyer’s capacity as a lawyer.
Weiner calls such speech a “relatively safe harbor for regulation”
as “there can be no legitimate dispute that it is appropriate to
regulate some speech occurring in court proceedings and in the
context of representing a client.”54 Weiner does not elaborate on
the contours of what “some speech” is subject to regulation and
what speech is not, but as he considers that context a “safe
50

L. Ali Khan, Disciplining Lawyers for Harassment and Discrimination: A
Time
for
Change,
JURIST
(July
11,
2017,
01:22:49
PM),
https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2017/07/ali-kahn-aba-rule-change/
[https://perma.cc/4ZCN-MTZR].
51
Dennis Rendleman, The Crusade Against Model Rule 8.4(g), A.B.A.:
YOURABA
(Oct.
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2018/october2018/the-crusade-against-model-rule-8-4-g-/ [https://perma.cc/6HAQ-QPFL].
52
Id.
53
He argues that it primarily regulates conduct. Robert N. Weiner, “Nothing to
See Here”: Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) and the First Amendment, 41
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 125, 130 (2018).
54
Id. at 130.
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harbor for regulation,” he pretty much provides carte blanche for
regulation of lawyers in the practice of law. His second category
is a slice of—again—“some speech” that regulators can
constitutionally prohibit even though it is outside of the context
of lawyering, “such as speech in furtherance of a fraud.”55 Again,
he provides no principle limiting or explaining the scope of this
alleged area of permissible restriction of lawyer speech. Weiner
then contends that the third category of speech affected by Model
Rule 8.4(g) is basically what is left over from the other two
categories—”a thin sliver . . . constituting speech beyond what is
indisputably subject to regulation.”56 Weiner contends that this
sliver is so small compared to what the bar “indisputably” can
regulate that it is essentially inconsequential.57 Basically, the
bar does not quite have plenary power to regulate attorney
speech—but nearly so.
Rebecca Aviel makes similar arguments, noting the allegedly
“many free speech rights that attorneys yield to obtain and keep
She concludes that state bars can
their law licenses.”58
determine whether or not they want to prioritize “free speech
value[s],” but that protecting lawyer free speech is not “a
compulsory obligation” on the state bar “imposed by the First
Amendment.”59
Claudia Haupt argues that lawyers, as members of a
professional “knowledge community,” should have the same free
speech rights as any other citizen when acting as a private
person.60 But for speech within one’s profession, she argues that
the First Amendment forbids state interference with the
professional knowledge community’s ability to communicate their
professional insights.61 However, Haupt argues that “the First
Amendment is not a roadblock to regulation of professionals’
speech by the profession.”62 Under her theory, as a member of a
55

Id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between
Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 37 (2018).
59
Id. at 39.
60
Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1255 (2016)
(“When professionals” are speaking as “ordinary citizens,” they “enjoy ordinary First
Amendment protection.”) (footnote omitted).
61
Id. at 1297, 1303.
62
Claudia E. Haupt, Antidiscrimination in the Legal Profession and the First
Amendment: A Partial Defense of Model Rule 8.4(g), 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 21
(2017)
(emphasis
added),
56
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professional knowledge community, one agrees to, and thus
waives rights against, regulations imposed by that community in
an exercise of self-regulation. Basically, “[m]embership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions”63—as long as those
conditions are prescribed by the bar.
In addition to the above scholarship, the ABA’s Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has issued
two formal opinions that embrace a constitutional conditions
approach. In March 2018, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 480,
which addresses attorney First Amendment rights in the context
of the duty of confidentiality. Written in the shadow of the 8.4(g)
battle, the ABA appears to endorse a conflation of the
constitutional conditions theory and the categorical approach.
Excluding extensive footnotes, the First Amendment analysis in
Opinion 480 is found primarily in this passage:
Here lawyer speech relates to First Amendment speech.
Although the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees individuals’ right to free speech, this
right is not without bounds. Lawyers’ professional conduct may
be constitutionally constrained by various professional
regulatory standards as embodied in the Model Rules, or similar
state analogs. For example, when a lawyer acts in a
representative capacity, courts often conclude that the lawyer’s
free speech rights are limited.64

It is important to unpack the astounding breadth of the
assertion of power made in Opinion 480. The ABA states that
lawyers’ First Amendment rights are “not without bounds.”65
And what are those bounds? The ABA responds that “[l]awyers’
professional conduct may be constitutionally constrained by
various professional regulatory standards as embodied in the
Model Rules, or similar state analogs.”66 There is no apparent
limitation—a
lawyer’s
professional
conduct
just
is
“constitutionally constrained” by regulatory standards adopted
by the ABA or the states.67 In Opinion 480, the ABA attempts to

https://www.pennjournalconlaw.com/uploads/4/7/7/5/47752841/haupt_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U42B-84U7].
63
In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84 (N.Y. 1917).
64
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 480, at 4 (2018) [hereinafter
ABA Op. 480] (emphasis added).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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assert for itself and the states the ability to regulate lawyers free
of constitutional constraint.68
Additionally, Opinion 480’s footnotes directly embrace the
constitutional conditions theory by quoting caselaw in the one
niche where that theory is still sometimes espoused: cases
punishing lawyers for derogation of the judiciary.69 I have
researched, written about, and consulted in this particular niche
for over a decade,70 and this body of caselaw is an affront to the
basic purposes underlying the First Amendment.71 Yet, post

68
A full analysis of ABA Opinion 480 is beyond the scope of this paper, but can
be found in Tarkington, supra note 30, at 60–74.
69
The first case cited in the footnotes of this section of Opinion 480 is In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643–47 (1985), in which the Supreme Court did not reach the
constitutional issue because it reversed as inappropriate under federal law the
extreme suspension sanction for criticizing the judiciary in a letter to the court. ABA
Op. 480, supra note 64, at 4 n.18. The other cases quoted or cited are U.S. Dist.
Court E. Dist. of Wash. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 1993), In re Shearin, 765
A.2d 930 (Del. 2000), Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841 (Ky. 2013), and State ex
rel. Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d 46 (Neb. 1982). Id. at 4 n.18.
The Opinion’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s Sandlin decision appears
disingenuous, given that Sandlin was later superseded by the highly influential
decision, Standing Comm. on Discipline of the U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal.
v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995), which recognized that lawyers do
have some level of First Amendment rights to criticize the judiciary and thus
disciplinary authorities have the burden to prove falsity and cannot punish
statements of opinion. See id. at 4 n.18. Yet Opinion 480 fails to cite to Yagman—
despite its major alteration of Sandlin and its prominence in the caselaw
surrounding impugning judicial integrity. See id. at 4 n.18; Yagman, 55 F.3d at
1437–38.
70
See TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 150–52; Margaret Tarkington, A Free
Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363,
364 (2010); Margaret Tarkington, Attorney Speech and the Right to an Impartial
Adjudicator, 30 REV. LITIG. 849, 864 (2011); Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be
Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1567, 1569–70 (2009) [hereinafter Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned].
Additionally, I have served as an expert or consultant on several disciplinary
proceedings regarding an attorney’s right to impugn judicial integrity in various
states.
71
A full discussion of the constitutional defects in these cases is beyond the
scope of this paper. But in summary, as I have previously shown, the constitutional
conditions theory is used in these cases to justify a prophylactic viewpointdiscriminatory prohibition on speech regarding the qualifications of—often elected—
public officials. These cases fly in the face of the core purposes and doctrines of the
First Amendment—and directly contravene N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 275 (1964), as well as Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964), written in
the very context of attorney speech derogating the judiciary—are antithetical to
democracy by enforcing public ignorance regarding judicial deficiencies, and work to
undermine the actual integrity of the judiciary. See, e.g., Tarkington, The Truth Be
Damned, supra note 70, at 1600; TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 158.
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Model Rule 8.4(g), these cases are discovered and embraced by
the ABA rather than receiving the condemnation they deserve.
For example, the ABA quotes a 1982 Nebraska case for the
following proposition:
A layman may, perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech or
political activities until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel or
slander, or into some infraction of our statutory law. A member
of the bar can, and will, be stopped at the point where he
infringes our Canons of Ethics.72

In this formulation, the First Amendment does not limit in
any way the power of the ABA or state regulators. Apparently,
as to “free speech or political activities,” a lawyer just “can, and
will, be stopped” whenever regulators so require by promulgating
a rule of professional conduct that forbids such speech or
activities. The ABA similarly cites a 2000 Delaware opinion for
the proposition that “lawyers’ constitutional free speech rights
are qualified by their ethical duties.”73 Again, the ABA is
asserting that lawyer First Amendment rights just “are
qualified” by whatever “ethical duties” the ABA or the bar may
impose.
In July 2020, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 493, directly
addressing “Model Rule 8.4(g): Purpose, Scope, and
Application.”74 As with Opinion 480, the section titled “Rule
8.4(g) and the First Amendment” begins by stating that “[t]he
Committee
does
not
address
constitutional
issues.”75
Nevertheless, the Committee then again quotes cases arising in
the context of speech impugning judicial integrity that embrace
For example, the
the constitutional conditions approach.76
Committee quotes the Kentucky Supreme Court for the
proposition that “regulation of lawyer speech ‘is appropriate in
order to maintain the public confidence and credibility of the

72
ABA Op. 480, supra note 64, at 4 n.18 (emphasis added) (quoting State ex rel.
Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Neb. 1982)).
73
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re Shearin, 765 A.2d 930, 938 (Del. 2000)).
74
ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 1.
75
Id. at 9.
76
See id. at 9 nn.48 & 49, 10 n.52 (relying on Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Blum, 404 S.W.3d
841, 855 (Ky. 2013), In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644–45 (1985), In re Sandlin, 12
F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1993), and In re Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184, 190–91 (N.Y.
1991)—all of which arise out of the context of lawyer discipline for speech that
impugns judicial integrity).
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judiciary and as a condition of “[t]he license granted by the
court.” ’ ”77
Conspicuously absent from either Opinion 480 or Opinion
493 is any mention of the dozen U.S. Supreme Court cases78 that
struck down punishment or prohibitions on lawyers as violative
of their First Amendment rights. Instead, In re Snyder79 is relied
on in both opinions and is the only U.S. Supreme Court decision
regarding lawyer First Amendment rights cited in either
opinion.80 And while Snyder is a case that arises in the niche of
punishing lawyers for impugning judicial integrity, it is also a
case where the Supreme Court did not even reach the First
Amendment issue raised, but reversed the suspension of the
lawyer on the nonconstitutional grounds of whether suspension
was warranted under federal law standards governing lawyer
Nevertheless, in Opinion 493, the Standing
discipline.81
Committee quotes Snyder dicta and expressly states that the
Snyder Court was purportedly “addressing the constitutional
authority of a court of appeals to discipline a lawyer for ‘conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar of the court.’ ”82 Yet, in fact, the
Snyder Court “avoid[ed] constitutional issues” and maintained
that “there [wa]s no occasion to reach petitioner’s constitutional
claims.”83
In addition to relying on the Snyder dicta and the
constitutional conditions theory as espoused by the Kentucky
Supreme Court when disciplining lawyers for criticizing the
judiciary, Opinion 493 focuses its First Amendment analysis on
arguing that the concepts of unconstitutionality on the grounds
of vagueness and overbreadth do not really apply—or apply with
significantly less force—in the context of regulating lawyer
speech.84 Again, the loss of these constitutional protections
against vague or overbroad laws are seemingly justified as a
matter-of-fact consequence or condition of joining the legal
Nevertheless, conspicuously absent from the
profession.85
Opinion’s discussion is any citation to or discussion of the
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 9 (quoting Blum, 404 S.W.3d at 855) (emphasis added).
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Snyder, 472 U.S. at 642–43.
ABA Op. 480, supra note 64, at 4 n.18.
Snyder, 472 U.S. at 642–43.
ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 9 (emphasis added).
472 U.S. at 642–43.
ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 9–11.
Id. at 10–11.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,
which struck down Nevada’s rule of professional conduct
regarding pretrial publicity as being unconstitutionally vague.86
Prior to Model Rule 8.4(g), legal academia overwhelmingly
rejected the constitutional conditions approach whereby lawyers
allegedly waived their First Amendment rights in exchange for
the privilege of practicing law as apparent from the writings of
Wendel, Sullivan, Day, Andrews, Chemerinsky, Freedman and
Starwood, Knake, Margulies, and myself.87 Yet now we have
Lynk, Gillers, Kahn, Rendleman, Aviel, Haupt, and Weiner
writing articles and the ABA issuing formal opinions apparently
embracing that basic premise and abandoning lawyers’ First
Amendment rights as a limit on regulation by the state bar or
promulgated by the ABA. These defenders of Model Rule 8.4(g)
additionally argue that the concerns that Model Rule 8.4(g) will
chill lawyer speech or advocacy or will be enforced against
unpopular people and viewpoints are merely hypothesized,
unrealistic parades of horribles.88 But ironically, these defenders’
own articles and arguments create a foundation for the most
frightening horrible imaginable as a consequence of this Model
Rule—abandoning the First Amendment rights of lawyers as a
restraint on professional regulation.
Moreover, the theory promoted by these scholars is not
limited to Model Rule 8.4(g) or to harassment or discrimination—
even though their arguments are made about that Rule or in its
shadow. If state bars are free to disregard the First Amendment
for this Rule, how can it be resurrected for other contexts? If
lawyers have waived their First Amendment rights as to
regulation by state bars or as promulgated by the ABA, then
those rights are waived and state bars can promulgate other
regulations and impose punishment without regard to the First
Amendment. Stripped of the prodiversity and antidiscrimination

86

501 U.S. 1030, 1048 (1991).
See Wendel, supra note 31, at 375–81; Sullivan, supra note 31, at 585–87;
Day, supra note 31, at 187–90; Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access, supra
note 35, at 771; Chemerinsky, supra note 33, at 863–67; Freedman & Starwood,
supra note 36, at 617; Knake, supra note 34, at 2844–46; Peter Margulies, Advocacy
as a Race to the Bottom: Rethinking Limits on Lawyers’ Free Speech, 43 U. MEM. L.
REV. 319, 324 (2012); supra note 70 and accompanying text.
88
See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 53, at 125 (“[T]he hypothetical horribles that
critics have paraded are remote and implausible.”); Rendleman, supra note 51
(stating that arguments against Model Rule 8.4(g) are “fantasies of creative
commentators”).
87
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context, what these commentators and the ABA in its formal
opinions are advocating is simply a power grab—the alleged
power of state bars and the ABA to regulate lawyers free of
constitutional constraint.
I do not doubt the good faith of defenders of Model Rule
8.4(g)—promoting inclusion and curbing harassment and
discrimination are imperative goals. And, as Opinion 493
contended, the murder of George Floyd and the protests and
social awareness that followed it demonstrate the critical need to
address and overcome discrimination.89 But those goals can and
must be pursued through constitutional measures. As Alexander
Meiklejohn expounded during the second Red Scare, the
regulator’s power to prevent evils is not plenary—if the First
Amendment “means anything, it means that certain substantive
evils which, in principle, [regulators have] a right to prevent,
must be endured if the only way of avoiding them is by the
abridging of that freedom of speech upon which the entire
structure of our free institutions rests.”90
Political power changes hands, the composition of state bars
varies, and state bar regulators have prosecutorial discretionary
power in enforcing lawyer regulation.
What bases seem
“justified” for making an exception today can be used as an
exception in a different context or by a different empowered
political faction tomorrow. Our own history demonstrates this
tragic path. The denial of lawyers’ First Amendment rights has
been employed to undermine both the civil rights movement and
the labor movement.91 It has been used to punish lawyer
criticism of the judiciary.92 It was used by the ABA in 1950 to
promulgate a rule requiring lawyers to take an anticommunism
It was used more recently to prohibit
loyalty oath.93
humanitarian groups from providing advice to alleged terrorists
about their rights under international law.94 The ABA’s recent

89

ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 1 n.3.
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 48 (1948) (emphasis added).
91
See generally NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437 (1963); see also Fisk, supra
note 29 (detailing punishment of labor lawyers).
92
See generally Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned, supra note 70; see also
TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 149–54.
93
Mary Elizabeth Basile, Loyalty Testing for Attorneys: When Is It Necessary
and Who Should Decide?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1843, 1848, 1856–57 (2009); The
Lawyer’s Loyalty Oath, 37 A.B.A. J. 128, 128 (1951).
94
See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36–37 (2010).
90
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formal opinions and the growing body of post-Model Rule 8.4(g)
scholarship renouncing lawyers’ First Amendment rights can,
and probably will, be cited by bar counsel in disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers who argue that their speech,
association, or petitioning falls within the First Amendment’s
protective shield.
It is incredibly foolish—even reckless—to jettison the First
Amendment to make way for any piece of regulation, no matter
how important the goal of that regulation may seem. Ends do
not justify such means, rather the means employed redefine the
ultimate ends achieved. One cannot employ the means of
undermining core principles of liberty—the First Amendment—
without reaping the ends of liberty undermined. In the face of
the ABA’s 1950 lawyer loyalty oaths, Zechariah Chafee chastised
regulators for undermining liberty “in the very process of
purporting to defend” it.95 As Justice Brandeis maintained,
liberty must be pursued as both our means and our end.96
Importantly, the renunciation of lawyers’ First Amendment
rights by defenders of Model Rule 8.4(g) is not only reckless, it is
also entirely unnecessary. As will be discussed in Part IV, a
constitutionally sound rule for prohibiting unlawful harassment
and discrimination is attainable. Neither the ABA nor the states
need to cut down the First Amendment to appropriately curb
lawyer discrimination and harassment.
III. LAWYER FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE
SYSTEM OF JUSTICE AND CANNOT BE ABANDONED
First and emphatically, neither the constitutional conditions
theory nor the categorical approach are the law. The Supreme
Court has held that lawyers have enforceable First Amendment
Rights—even as to regulations created by the state bar and even

95
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 156 (1956). Chafee
eloquently explained:
The only way to preserve “the existence of free American institutions” is to
make free institutions a living force. To ignore them in the very process of
purporting to defend them, as frightened men urge, will leave us little
worth defending. We must choose between freedom and fear—we cannot
have both.
Id. (emphasis added).
96
“Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was
to make men free to develop their faculties . . . . They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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in the context of lawyering.97 And the Supreme Court has been
correct in so holding. Lawyer First Amendment rights are key to
the protection of the justice system itself—a point previously
discussed at length and summarized here.98
Attorneys play a key role in the proper functioning of our
system of justice. Their speech, association, and petitioning are
essential to the protection of client rights. The First Amendment
rights of lawyers protect the attorney-client relationship—the
defining attribute of nearly all lawyering—and the core fiduciary
duties owed to the client. For example, the First Amendment
protects the right of the attorney to associate with the client, to
counsel with the client and render candid advice, to invoke the
protections of the law on behalf of the client through speech, and
to advocate for the client through speech and by petitioning for
redress. The Supreme Court recognized these core attributes of
attorneys’ First Amendment rights in its seminal case, NAACP v.
Button.99
In Button, several of the southern states in resistance to
Brown v. Board of Education,100 amended their professional
conduct rules by redefining solicitation to prohibit the activities
of the NAACP in obtaining clients and instigating desegregation
lawsuits on their behalf.101 The Virginia Supreme Court had held
that the NAACP’s activities of holding meetings with parents of
school children, advising them of their legal rights, offering to
represent them, and then instigating desegregation litigation
were prohibited by the redefined prohibition on solicitation and
that the First Amendment did not offer them recourse.102 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute as construed
by the Virginia Supreme Court unconstitutionally violated the
First Amendment rights of “speech, petition, [and] assembly” of
both the attorneys and their clients, specifically recognizing
attorneys’ rights to engage in “political expression and
association” by associating with these clients, advising them of
their rights, and then petitioning the government for redress on
their behalf.103 Virginia, along with other Southern states, had

97

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 14.
99
371 U.S. 415, 428–29, 434, 437 (1963).
100
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101
See Button, 371 U.S. at 445–46 (Douglas, J., concurring).
102
NAACP v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55, 72 (Va. 1960).
103
Button, 371 U.S. at 430–31.
98
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only technically regulated attorney speech—but that restriction
on attorney speech had the—intended—effect of undermining the
rights of African Americans and foreclosing their ability to either
know of or attain their constitutional rights to desegregation.104
The attorney’s right to associate with clients, advise them,
and petition on their behalf is essential to the proper vindication
of legal rights and of due process, particularly for minority or
unpopular groups. Protecting lawyers’ First Amendment rights
works to protect individual and collective life, liberty and
property.
As Button illustrates, government entities and
regulators, if free to regulate without the constraint of the First
Amendment, could infringe the constitutional rights of disfavored
or unpopular groups simply by creating regulation on lawyer
speech and association.
Lawyer First Amendment rights are also essential to the
checking of government and institutional power. As Vincent
Blasi established, the “checking value” of free speech was a
primary rationale underlying the creation of the First
Amendment.105 The checking value is “the value that free speech,
a free press, and free assembly can serve in checking the abuse of
power by public officials.”106 As a nation, we constantly rely on
lawyers to perform this checking function—to bring lawsuits that
challenge the use of governmental power. The amount of power
checking performed by attorneys is immense. It occurs in
lawsuits checking government power of local school boards all the
way up to the U.S. President. Even outside the governmental
context, we rely on lawyers to check institutional and economic
power, for example, through lawsuits for protection of consumers,
employers, shareholders, and the environment. While lawyers
also represent the empowered, as lawyers work for money, they
do play a major role in our governmental structure by checking
the use and misuse of power when they represent those who are
harmed and petition on their behalf for redress of grievances.
Historically, laws that undermine lawyers’ First Amendment
rights have negatively affected or have been aimed at unpopular
contingencies—including
African
Americans
during
desegregation, alleged terrorists following 9/11, communists in
the 1950s, welfare recipients, debtors, and criminal
104

Id. at 435–36; see also id. at 445–46 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527.
106
Id.
105
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defendants.107 Checking power is a primary rationale underlying
the creation of the First Amendment and influencing its
interpretation—and it is a primary rationale for carefully
safeguarding the First Amendment rights of lawyers.108
Lawyers’ First Amendment rights do not solely protect
client rights but are essential to the invocation of judicial power
in our system of justice. The judicial power is specifically limited
to cases and controversies brought before the judiciary.109 If
there is no case or controversy filed before it, the judiciary is
powerless to act—no matter how egregious or important the
underlying issue appears to be.110 It is through attorneys that
cases and controversies are brought before the judiciary, enabling
the exercise of the judicial power. Although individuals in theory
can proceed pro se, entities cannot,111 there is no question that
the effective invocation of the judicial power is accomplished by
attorneys. If lawyers cannot associate with clients and bring
cases before the judiciary, the judiciary is utterly powerless to
act. The lawyer’s ability to enable the judicial power is as
essential to our justice system as is the judiciary itself.
In Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, the Supreme
Court correctly recognized that the protection of lawyers’ First
Amendment rights is directly related to the proper functioning of
the judicial power.112 Thus in that case, where lawyers for the
107

See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010)
(attorneys wishing to represent designated foreign terrorist organizations); Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 233–34 (2010) (attorneys
representing debtors); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 414–15 (2006) (prosecutor
who provided exculpatory materials to criminal defendant); Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001) (attorneys representing welfare recipients);
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991) (criminal defense attorney);
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 415–17 (1978) (attorney representing woman sterilized
as condition of receiving welfare benefits); Button, 371 U.S. at 417–18 (NAACP
attorneys instigating desegregation lawsuits); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353
U.S. 252, 253 (1957) (law school graduate who was denied admission to the bar for
allegedly having communist ties or sympathies); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of
N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 234–35 (1957) (same).
108
Tarkington, supra note 30, at 55.
109
U.S. CONST. Art. III § 2, cl. 1.
110
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557–59, 565–67 (1992) (rejecting a
challenge to regulations that would have narrowed the scope of endangered species
protections on grounds of standing).
111
See, e.g., Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506
U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993) (“It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . .
that a corporation may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel.”)
(citing Osborn v. President, Dirs. & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 829 (1824).
112
531 U.S. at 545–46.
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Legal Services Corporation had been prohibited by Congress
from challenging the validity of welfare laws when representing
welfare recipients, the Supreme Court vindicated the lawyers’
First Amendment rights to bring all colorable arguments
“necessary for proper resolution of the case.”113 The Court held
that “[b]y seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain legal issues
and to truncate presentation to the courts,” the regulations
“prohibit[ ] speech and expression upon which courts must
depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power.”114
Given the critical importance of lawyers’ First Amendment
rights to the proper functioning of the justice system,
commentators and the ABA are reckless to toss out lawyer First
Amendment rights to shore up the constitutionality of Model
Rule 8.4(g).
IV. FALSE DICHOTOMY: AMEND MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AND STOP
STOKING THE CULTURE WAR
Because the First Amendment rights of lawyers are essential
to protecting the integrity of the justice system, they cannot be
abandoned. If we had to choose between the First Amendment
and curbing discrimination and harassment, the First
Amendment should stay. But we do not have to make that
choice. The recent passage of modified versions of 8.4(g) by
Maine and New Hampshire both make great strides in the
creation of antidiscrimination rules that are constitutionally
sound. As I have previously stated, the constitutionality of
civility, antidiscrimination, and antiharassment rules depends
entirely on the specific rule—on precisely what speech,
association or petitioning is suppressed and the extent of the
rule’s reach.115 As the Supreme Court admonished in Button,
“[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are
suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”116
And that is the problem with Model Rule 8.4(g)—its breadth.
The Rule as promulgated reaches far beyond sexual harassment
or unlawful discrimination. Since its promulgation, Vermont and
New Mexico are the only states to adopt the Rule as
113

Id. at 545.
Id. (emphasis added).
115
TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 245.
116
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (emphasis added) (citations
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promulgated.117
Pennsylvania adopted a slightly modified
version of the rule in 2020, only to have the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania find that the rule constituted “viewpoint-based
discrimination in violation of the First Amendment” and enjoined
the rule pending a complete constitutional challenge.118
Additionally, the Attorney Generals of Texas, South Carolina,
Louisiana, and Tennessee have all written opinions that Rule
8.4(g) is unconstitutional as violating attorneys’ rights to freedom
of speech, association, and religion.119 Arizona, Idaho, Illinois,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, South Carolina, and
Tennessee have all formally rejected the Rule,120 with the
Montana legislature taking the exceptional step of intervening
and passing a resolution declaring that the Montana Supreme
Court lacked the authority to enact such a rule regulating
lawyers.121
But Model Rule 8.4(g) certainly could be narrowed to be
constitutionally sound. Indeed, Maine and New Hampshire
recently adopted versions of the rule that resolve the main
objections to Model Rule 8.4(g). Notably, the constitutional
117

VT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017); N.M. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 16-804(G) (2019). Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania have each
adopted variations of Model Rule 8.4(g). See N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g)
(2019); ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019); MO. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 4-8.4(g) (2019); PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020). As discussed below,
Maine’s and New Hampshire’s respective variations of the rule resolve many of the
First Amendment issues.
118
See PA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020); Greenberg v. Haggerty, Civ.
Action No. 20-3822, 2020 WL 7227251, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2020) (granting a
preliminary injunction and finding a likelihood of success on the merits of the
constitutional challenge, finding in part that “Rule 8.4(g) and Comments 3 and 4, are
viewpoint-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.”).
119
See Tenn. Att’y Gen., Op. No. 18-11, at 5 (Mar. 16, 2018); La. Att’y Gen., Op.
No. 17–0114, at 2 (Sept. 8, 2017); S.C. Att’y Gen., Op. Letter (May 1, 2017); Tex.
Att’y Gen., Op. No. KP-0123 (Dec. 20, 2016).
120
See POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, JURISDICTIONAL
ADOPTION OF RULE 8.4(G) OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(Oct. 8, 2019) [hereinafter JURISDICTIONAL ADOPTION OF RULE 8.4(G)],
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/c
hart_adopt_8_4_g.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/GML6-82UK]; Daniel A.
Horwitz, Tennessee Supreme Court Denies Proposed Rule Change Attempting to
Police Discrimination and Harassment, SUP. CT. OF TENN. BLOG (April 23, 2018),
https://scotblog.org/category/rules-of-professional-conduct/
[https://perma.cc/Y7LYQC6Y].
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See S.J. Res. 15, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017); Lorelei Laird, Montana
Legislature Says ABA Model Rule on Discrimination and Harassment Violates First
Amendment,
ABA
JOURNAL
(Apr.
13,
2017,
4:58
PM),
www.abajournal.com/news/article/montana_legislature_says_aba_model_rule_on_discri
mination_and_harassment_vi. [https://perma.cc/3YN4-ZRHA].
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problems with Model Rule 8.4(g) arise primarily from the
comments.
Even Rebecca Aviel, while rejecting First
Amendment constraints and defending the Rule on the whole,
admits that the comments, if taken at face value—which they
should be as the ABA promulgated them as part of the Rule—are
Specifically, the comments
constitutionally problematic.122
broadly define prohibited discrimination as “harmful verbal or
physical conduct that manifests bias or prejudice towards others”
and define prohibited harassment to include “derogatory or
demeaning verbal or physical conduct.”123 Of course, “verbal
conduct” is simply speech. Moreover, the reach of 8.4(g) extends
to “[c]onduct related to the practice of law,” which the comments
define to include not only the practice of law and managing a law
business, but also “participating in bar association, business or
social activities in connection with the practice of law.”124 Thus
the Rule would apply at CLEs, bar dinners and events, and the
ABA’s official report on the rule indicated it would even reach
into “lobby[ing]” and “law schools.”125
By broadly prohibiting speech “that manifests bias or
prejudice” or that is “derogatory or demeaning” on the bases of
“race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status”—specifically at CLEs and bar functions,
and perhaps even in law schools and lobbying—the rule could
easily be interpreted as foreclosing “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open” debate and discussion on many of the “the major
public issues of our time.”126 The Model Rule’s comments are
written so broadly as to include within the scope of its
prohibitions political speech supporting traditional marriage,
gender identity issues, including bathroom and locker room
usage, homosexual and single parent adoptions and surrogacies,
birth control and abortion, terrorism, immigration, and refugee
assistance—to name only a few. These are issues of importance
to millions of Americans that divide our country and that drive
citizens to vote for particular parties or candidates. Importantly,
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Aviel, supra note 58, at 50–55.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) & cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(emphasis added).
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Id., cmt. 4.
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See ABA REPORT 109, supra note 6, at 2.
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Rule 8.4(g) tends to cut out expression on only one side of a given
debate. Views expressing conservative or traditional views are
chilled or foreclosed because they may be interpreted as
“manifest[ing] bias or prejudice” or being “derogatory or
demeaning,” while expression of liberal views are not similarly
In fact, the comments even expressly provide
chilled.127
exceptions to allow for liberal prodiversity positions, including
allowing lawyers to “engage in conduct undertaken to promote
diversity and inclusion without violating this Rule” such as
“recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or
sponsoring diverse law student organizations”128 and also
expressly allowing lawyers to “limit[ ] the lawyer’s practice to
members of underserved populations.”129
Ultimately, these hot-button political issues will be resolved
by laws, regulations, and policies, which will be determined and
enforced through legislation, court cases, and executive action—
all of which is entirely dependent on lawyers. It is lawyers who
will draft policies, litigate cases, write legislation, and execute
the law. To cut lawyers on one side of these issues out of the
conversation undermines the role of the lawyer in the system of
justice. Lawyers are the very people who have the knowledge,
skills, and ability to articulate and implement legal policies,
accommodations, and options—as well as to air and evaluate
grievances and to propose legal remedies. Silencing lawyers from
expressing their opinions on these issues—especially to other
lawyers at law-related functions, CLEs, law school presentations,
and conferences—will forestall the wheels of political change; it
will silence much-needed conversation and accommodation across
the aisle of political divide. The broad reach of Rule 8.4(g)
constitutes viewpoint discrimination of political speech on the
great issues of our times against the very people who are
necessary to consider and implement political change.130
In its July 2020 Formal Opinion 493, the ABA’s Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated in its
introduction and conclusion that Rule 8.4(g) “does not prevent a
lawyer from freely expressing opinions and ideas on matters of

127

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
Id., cmt. 4.
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Id., cmt. 5.
130
See TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at ch. 14, for a full analysis of the
constitutional issues surrounding Model Rule 8.4(g) and the permissible scope of
antidiscrimination and antiharassment lawyer regulation.
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public concern.”131 While that interpretation of 8.4(g) is greatly
appreciated, the fact of the matter is that the Rule as written
readily includes such speech within its prohibitions, which is why
such a statement was necessary. Unfortunately, while this
statement is repeated twice in Formal Opinion 493, there is
absolutely no analysis of the issue—just a matter of fact
conclusory statement without any examination or principled
interpretation of the text of the Rule that would reach that
result.132 Indeed, the most likely explanation for a lack of textual
analysis of the Rule to show that it does not reach such speech is
that any objective textual analysis of the Rule would
demonstrate that, as written, the Rule clearly encompasses such
speech within its prohibitions. Rather than simply making a one
sentence conclusory statement in Opinion 493 that expression of
political speech is protected—without making any changes at all
to the actual Rule or its breadth—it would be far better and more
effective for the ABA to amend and narrow the text of the Rule
itself so that the prohibitions therein do not on their face
encompass such speech.
Importantly, the inclusion of this one sentence asserting that
the Rule does not prohibit expressions of opinions and ideas on
matters of public concern added to an ABA Ethics Opinion does
not have the force of law—at best, it could be cited as persuasive
authority in a jurisdiction adopting Model Rule 8.4(g). Yet the
text of the Rule, once adopted by a jurisdiction, does have the
force of law, and that text as promulgated includes within its
reach speech on the major issues of our day. If the ABA wants to
ensure that Rule 8.4(g) should not reach lawyers who are “freely
expressing opinions and ideas on matters of public concern,” then
they need to change the text of the rule so that it does not reach
such speech, or at the very least amend Rule 8.4(g) so that this
proviso is expressly included in the rule proper.133 Moreover, this
is not the only constitutional deficiency with the Rule that needs
amendment, as explored below.
Indeed, the overarching point of this Article is that the fact
that Model Rule 8.4(g) as promulgated is unconstitutional does
not mean that we have to choose between the First Amendment
and antidiscrimination. We do not. Instead, Rule 8.4(g) needs to
be amended and the constitutional deficiencies in the Rule itself
131
132
133
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need to be fixed. Maine’s May 2019 and New Hampshire’s July
2019 adoptions of revised versions of Model Rule 8.4(g)
demonstrate
that
drafting
a
constitutionally
sound
antidiscrimination rule is attainable. Moreover, the fact that
states have previously enacted antidiscrimination rules
demonstrates that states are not averse to enacting such rules,
should a constitutionally sound one be promulgated. Model Rule
8.4(g)’s lack of traction is due to its overbreadth. Again, “[b]road
prophylactic rules,” such as the promulgated Model Rule 8.4(g),
“are suspect” in the realm of First Amendment rights; instead,
“[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms.”134
A.

Examining the Maine and New Hampshire Rules

The passage of Maine’s Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g)
in May 2019 was heralded by defenders of Model Rule 8.4(g) as a
vindication of the Model Rule. Indeed, Ten Stallings wrote in
Legal Ethics in Motion that the Maine rule was “almost
identical” to the Model Rule,135 and the ABA Journal headlined,
“Second State Adopts ABA Model Rule Barring Discrimination
and Harassment by Lawyers,” claiming that the Maine Rule only
“differs slightly from the ABA model rule.”136
But Maine’s reworking of the rule—like New Hampshire’s—
is a major revamp and adjustment, carefully tailored to avoid
encroaching on lawyer First Amendment rights. The passage of
these rules should be seen as a victory for the First Amendment
and a refutation of Model Rule 8.4(g) as promulgated. The Maine
and New Hampshire Rules do not bolster the purported
constitutionality of Model Rule 8.4(g). Instead, their alterations
of the Model Rule reveal many of the most glaring ways in which
the Model Rule infringes on lawyer First Amendment rights.

134

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
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Perhaps most importantly, the Maine and New Hampshire rules
can serve as “model rules” that other states, and the ABA, could
emulate as a demonstration that the First Amendment and
antidiscrimination are not mutually exclusive.
1.

Removing Socioeconomic Status

The first notable difference between Maine’s Rule and the
Model Rule is Maine’s removal of socioeconomic status and
marital status from the list of prohibited bases of discrimination
and harassment. Similarly, the New Hampshire rule omits
socioeconomic status.
Yet under Model Rule 8.4(g) and its comments, a lawyer is
prohibited from speech and conduct that “manifests bias or
prejudice” or is “derogatory or demeaning” on the basis of
socioeconomic status.137 Ronald Rotunda noted that under this
provision a lawyer could apparently engage in misconduct by
decrying the idleness or greed of the upper one percent.138 He
concludes, somewhat tongue in cheek, that while “we all should
be able to attack the upper 1%,” unfortunately, “the ABA didn’t
write the rule that way.”139
More seriously, Eugene Volokh explored the potential
problems of a rule that forbids all speech and conduct that
“manifests bias or prejudice” on the basis of socioeconomic
status—including, as the Rule does, in “operating or managing a
law firm or law practice.”140 Volokh points out that the Model
Rule does not define socioeconomic status and states that “the
one definition” he is familiar with is an interpretation of “a
similar ban on socioeconomic status discrimination in the
Sentencing Guidelines,” which defines it as “‘an individual’s

137

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) & cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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status in society as determined by objective criteria such as
education, income, and employment.’”141
Moreover, he cites cases from the Fifth and Fourth Circuits
that include discrimination on the basis of “wealth as an element
of socioeconomic status.”142 Volokh notes that under a literal
reading of Model Rule 8.4(g), violations could include such things
as “preferring more-educated employees,” “preferring employees
who went to . . . Ivy League schools,” “contracting with expert
witnesses and expert consultants who are especially welleducated,” “preferring a wealthier would-be partner over a poorer
one,” or even “preferring lower-socioeconomic-status employees”
to give them a hand up.143
The problem that both Rotunda and Volokh identify is that
the Model Rule’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of
socioeconomic status either (1) cannot be taken literally, or (2) if
taken literally, would forbid social commentary and employment
practices that clearly should neither be prohibited nor be a basis
for discipline.
Indeed, the examples Volokh describes as
potentially prohibited are, in fact, wise and productive
employment and litigation practices. While it is tempting to
dismiss such criticism by claiming that state bars would never
subject such actions to discipline, the problem is that a straight
reading of the Model Rule and its comments in fact prohibits
these practices. Thus, the Model Rule opens the way for
arbitrary interpretation and enforcement, as well as to selfcensorship because “[t]he threat of sanctions may deter”
activities and speech “almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions.”144 This is precisely why overbroad rules
are constitutionally problematic. Both the Maine and New
Hampshire Rules wisely avoided this particular quagmire by
simply omitting socioeconomic status as one of the prohibited
bases of discrimination.145
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Redefining Prohibited Discrimination

The major and most imperative change made in both the
Maine and New Hampshire Rules was to entirely scrap the
Model Rule’s definition of discrimination. Instead of broadly
defining discrimination to include all harmful speech and
conduct that “manifests bias or prejudice” on one of the
enumerated bases,146 the Maine Rule started from scratch,
enacting this definition of discrimination into the Rule proper:
“Discrimination” on the basis of race, sex, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or gender
identity as used in this section means conduct or
communication that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know
manifests an intention: to treat a person as inferior based on
one or more of the characteristics listed in this paragraph; to
disregard relevant considerations of individual characteristics
or merit because of one or more of the listed characteristics; or
to cause or attempt to cause interference with the fair
administration of justice based on one or more of the listed
characteristics.147

There are several important changes in that redefinition of
discrimination from the Model Rule. First, the Rule prohibits
“communication” rather than “verbal conduct.”148 While speech is
generally communication, as people speak to communicate, the
word communication implies that the prohibited discrimination
or harassment is aimed or directed at an individual. Such a
construction is reinforced by the rest of the definition of
“discrimination.” Notably, while the Model Rule prohibits speech
that “manifests bias or prejudice,”149 Maine’s rule instead
requires that the “communication” must “manifest[ ] an
intention” to do one of three things: (1) “to treat a person as
inferior based on one or more of the characteristics listed in this
paragraph;” or (2) “to disregard relevant considerations of
individual characteristics or merit because of one or more of the
listed characteristics;” or (3) “to cause or attempt to cause
interference with the fair administration of justice based on one
or more of the listed characteristics.”150
146
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Unlike the Model Rule’s definition, which readily can be
construed to prohibit speech in favor of traditional marriage,
because it could be viewed as “manifest[ing] bias” on the basis of
sexual orientation, or other conservative political speech,
commentary, or advocacy, the Maine Rule would require
significant contortion to be construed to prohibit such
commentary.151 Further, the Model Rule does not require that
the bias or prejudice be aimed at a specific person or individual—
if the speech “manifests bias or prejudice” in the abstract on one
of the prohibited bases, it falls within the Model Rule comment’s
definition.152 That aspect of the Rule is precisely what made the
Model Rule susceptible to concerns that it could easily be
interpreted to foreclose discussions on hot-button political topics
at CLEs and other law-related functions. For example, David
French—a lawyer and a columnist for the National Review—
wrote a column objecting to Model Rule 8.4(g), explaining that he
expresses opinions at law-related functions, including CLEs and
law school panels, that seemed to clearly fall within the ambit of
the Model Rule’s prohibitions153—such as his view “that men
cannot become women,” that “same-sex marriage is not protected
by the Constitution” and is “not truly a marriage,” and that
“violent jihad is deeply imprinted in the DNA of Islam.”154 While
French’s views seem to fall squarely within the Model Rule’s
prohibition on speech that “manifests bias or prejudice” on the
bases of sexual orientation, gender identity, and religion, it is far
harder to fit them into the prohibitions of the Maine Rule,
because the expression of these opinions are not aimed at any
specific individual and they do not express any intention to
actually “treat a person as inferior” or “disregard relevant
considerations of individual characteristics or merit” or “cause or
attempt to cause interference with the fair administration of
justice” as required by the Maine Rule’s definition of
discrimination.155 Even Rebecca Aviel, a defender of the Model
Rule, was concerned that the Model Rule could be interpreted to
foreclose political speech and prohibit or punish the expression of
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“biased” or “prejudiced” views or opinions, because it did not
require that the prohibited discrimination or harassment be
aimed at a specific individual.156
But the Maine Rule did not stop at redefining discrimination
so as to avoid including within its definition expression of
viewpoints on political or traditional moral issues. Its final
sentence emphasizes that “advocacy of policy positions or
changes in the law are not regulated by Rule 8.4(g).”157
The Maine Rule also specifically defines harassment. Its
definition of harassment is not as narrowly tailored as its
definition of discrimination and perhaps could be improved.158
But its definition of harassment is narrower than the Model
Rule. The Maine Rule defines harassment as “derogatory or
demeaning conduct or communication and includes, but is not
limited to, unwelcome sexual advances, or other conduct or
communication unwelcome due to its implicit or explicit sexual
content.”159 This definition is more similar to Model Rule 8.4(g)’s
definition of harassment as “sexual harassment and derogatory
or demeaning verbal or physical conduct.”160
Notably, the Maine Rule again uses the term
“communication,” arguably indicating that the prohibited
derogatory or demeaning speech has to be directed at a specific
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person.161 Moreover, the sentence structure of the Maine Rule
places sexual harassment not as a separately prohibited category
of harassment, as in the Model Rule, but as the quintessential
example of what constitutes derogatory or demeaning conduct
and communication. This structure shores up an interpretation
that punishable communications have to be directed at a specific
individual, as with sexual harassment, rather than just being—
as defined in the Model Rule—an expression that is “derogatory
or demeaning” to a particular class of persons.162 And again, the
Maine Rule clarifies overarchingly that “advocacy of policy
positions” is simply “not regulated by Rule 8.4(g),”163 making it
unlikely that someone expressing conservative political or policy
viewpoints could be found to have engaged in harassment—even
if others might think such views or positions are derogatory or
demeaning.
Using a different tack than Maine, New Hampshire modified
the overarching prohibition of the rule rather than specifically
modifying the definitions of “discrimination” and “harassment”—
but did so to a similar effect. New Hampshire Rule 8.4(g) forbids
lawyers from:
[T]ak[ing] any action, while acting as a lawyer . . . if the lawyer
knows or it is obvious that the action has the primary purpose
to embarrass, harass or burden another person, including
conduct motivated by animus against the other person based
upon the other person’s race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, physical or mental disability, age, sexual orientation,
marital status or gender identity.164
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as conduct that “is aggressively invasive, pressuring, or intimidating.” See ABA Op.
493, supra note 13, at 7. Nevertheless, if this is what the ABA understands should
constitute harassment under Model Rule 8.4(g), then harassment under that rule
should actually be defined that way in the text of the rule itself instead of being
defined as “derogatory or demeaning” speech and conduct. MODEL RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) & cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). But the Formal Opinion’s
assertion that “harassment” under Model Rule 8.4(g) is actually intended to cover
“aggressively invasive, pressuring, or intimidating” speech or conduct is somewhat
undercut by the Formal Opinion’s repeated assertions that violations of Rule 8.4(g)
do not require a showing that conduct or speech is “severe or pervasive,” but could
include even a “single instance of a lawyer making a derogatory sexual comment.”
See ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 1, 4, 7.
163
ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g)(4) (2019).
164
N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019) (emphasis added).
162
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Notably, the New Hampshire Rule is limited to “tak[ing] any
action”—and does not even specifically prohibit mere speech.165
While an “action” could certainly include speech, New
Hampshire’s Rule is further limited to those actions that have
“the primary purpose to embarrass, harass or burden another
person, including conduct motivated by animus.”166 Additionally,
a comment added to the Rule by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court clarifies that “[t]he rule does not prohibit conduct that
lacks this primary purpose, even if the conduct incidentally
produces, or has the effect or impact of producing, the described
result.”167
Again, as with the Maine Rule, it is far harder to argue that
the New Hampshire Rule could be interpreted to forbid political
commentary supporting conservative and far right views, such as
those expressed by David French noted above. Political debate
and commentary regarding traditional marriage, gender identity,
or immigration does not have as its “primary purpose to
embarrass, harass, or burden another person.”168 The New
Hampshire Rule thus requires an identifiable specific victim of
the action taken—addressing the deficiency in the Model Rule
identified by Rebecca Aviel.169 The requirement of an identifiable
individual victim is underscored by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court’s comment that incidental effects and impacts are
insufficient—rather, the lawyer’s action must have, and thus the
state bar must prove as an element of discipline, the “primary
purpose of embarrassing, harassing, or burdening another
person.”170
Not stopping there, the New Hampshire Rule further
includes a First Amendment proviso—something that the ABA
included in earlier drafts of Rule 8.4(g), but omitted in the final
promulgated rule.171 The New Hampshire Rule clarifies that the
165

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
167
Id., Sup. Ct. cmt. (emphasis added).
168
Id., 8.4(g) (emphasis added).
169
See Aviel, supra note 58, at 55–61.
170
N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g), Sup. Ct. cmt. (2019) (emphasis
added).
171
Josh Blackman reviews the legislative history of Model Rule 8.4(g) and
explains that at the February 2016 meeting, Laurel Bellows, a prior ABA president,
urged dropping the proviso because “[w]e know the constitution governs.” Blackman,
supra note 7, at 249 (quoting A.B.A. Midyear Meeting: Public Hearing Before the
A.B.A House of Delegates, A.B.A H.D. 17 (2016) (statement of Laurel Bellows, former
President, ABA). Unfortunately, when actually adopting the rule, the Committee did
166
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Rule does not “preclude a lawyer from engaging in conduct or
speech or from maintaining associations that are constitutionally
protected, including advocacy on matters of public policy, the
exercise of religion, or a lawyer’s right to advocate for a client.”172
Thus, even were one to contort the first part of the Rule to
prohibit political advocacy on public issues or to undermine
lawyers’ religious or associational rights, the New Hampshire
Rule expressly recognizes the existence and protection of such
rights, asserting that they are not undermined or affected by the
Rule.
3.

Narrowing the Scope of “Related to the Practice of Law”

Another major problem with the breadth of Model Rule
8.4(g) is the scope of its application. Again, take French’s
example that Model Rule 8.4(g) forbids his commentary about
Islam, gender identity, or traditional marriage at CLEs or law
school functions. Yet, such commentary could not fall within
Maine’s Rule 8.4(g) because that rule narrowly defines “[r]elated
to the practice of law” to mean “occurring in the course of
representing clients; interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court
personnel, lawyers, and others while engaged in the practice of
law; or operating or managing a law firm or law practice.”173
Thus the Maine Rule, like nearly all of the antidiscrimination
rules previously enacted by state bars, does not attempt to reach
outside the actual practice of law and into CLEs, social functions,
law school panels, lobbying, etc. The Model Rule comments
expansively define “conduct related to the practice of law” to
include “participating in bar association, business or social
activities in connection with the practice of law”174 with the
ABA’s Report indicating the Rule would additionally reach
“lobbyists” and “settings [ ] such as law schools.”175
not reaffirm—and the defenders of the Model Rule have not reaffirmed—that the
First Amendment rights of lawyers “govern.” Instead, Myles Lynk advanced to the
Committee a constitutional conditions theory indicating that lawyers simply lack
First Amendment rights as to certain lawyer regulation and would lack such rights
vis-à-vis this Rule. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. As shown above,
the defenders of the Model Rule similarly discard the First Amendment rights of
lawyers rather than insisting that the Constitution governs and forbids
infringement of such rights by the rule or interpretation thereof. See supra Part II.
172
N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019).
173
ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g)(3) (2019) (emphasis added).
174
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
175
ABA REPORT 109, supra note 6, at 2. The ABA’s Report and the legislative
history indicates that this expansion was intended to capture sexual harassment at
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Indeed, it was this extension of Model Rule 8.4(g)—to
contexts outside the actual practice of law—that made way for
the Montana legislatures’ primary argument that Rule 8.4(g) is
unconstitutional. The Montana legislature explained that its
supreme court is given the power to regulate the practice of law
and to determine if lawyers are fit to practice but does not have
the power to impose general rules governing conduct or speech
outside of law practice. The Montana legislature considered this
aspect of the Model Rule as usurping legislative power to govern
citizen conduct outside of law practice.176 The Maine Rule wisely
avoids this minefield entirely by limiting its scope to the practice
of law or operation/management of a law firm.
4.

Eliminating Liberal-Leaning Pro-Diversity Exceptions

Model Rule 8.4(g) specifically authorizes pro-diversity
exceptions to its rule, such as allowing lawyers to “engage in
conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without
violating this Rule”177 and expressly allowing lawyers to “limit[ ]
the lawyer’s practice to members of underserved populations.”178
Neither the Maine Rule nor the New Hampshire Rule
contain any pro-diversity or liberal-leaning carve outs—avoiding
the culture war of Model Rule 8.4(g). And why should there be
exceptions to manifesting bias and prejudice for liberals to
promote their pet ideas, but not for conservatives? The inclusion
of liberal-leaning exceptions undermined Model Rule 8.4(g)’s
traction with states as plausibly politically neutral. The New
Hampshire Rule, as noted, includes a First Amendment proviso
protecting all lawyers’ First Amendment rights—not just those
on the left.179 Further, the Maine Rule correctly carves out, and

dinner events, CLEs, etc. Id. at 11 (“[C]onduct related to the practice of law includes
activities such as law firm dinners and other nominally social events at which
lawyers are present solely because of their association with their law firm or in
connection with their practice of law. [The Committee] was presented with
substantial anecdotal information that sexual harassment takes place at such
events.”); see also Blackman, supra note 7, at 244. But if a jurisdiction wants to stop
sexual harassment in such contexts, then the jurisdiction should narrowly define the
prohibition as covering sexual harassment in those contexts and not as prohibiting
all speech that “manifests bias or prejudice” or is “derogatory or demeaning.” MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); Blackman, supra
note 7, at 245.
176
See S.J. Res. 15, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2017).
177
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) & cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
178
Id., cmt. 5.
179
N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2019).
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protects, all cause lawyering, and not just that done on behalf of
“underserved populations.” The Maine Rule states: “[L]imiting
one’s practice to particular clients or types of clients” is “not
regulated by Rule 8.4(g).”180
As I previously argued, cause lawyering—limiting a lawyer’s
practice to a specific set of legal issues, clientele, or populations—
has a long and beneficial history in the United States system of
justice.181 While some cause lawyering falls within the Model
Rule’s carve out for limiting one’s practice to “underserved
populations,” other cause lawyering, like protecting fathers’
rights or advocating for women, does not.
Association with a specific clientele or type of client is
essential to the successful political advocacy of lawyers devoted
to using their license to protect the rights of a particular class of
persons, or to secure specific social or political change.
Concomitantly, the client cannot effectively invoke judicial power
without the aid of the lawyer. Attorneys have First Amendment
rights to associate with specific clients, to speak with them and
on their behalf, and to petition on their behalf—and thus to
pursue and achieve the political ends of both the attorney and
client. Such focused association and advocacy falls within core
lawyer First Amendment rights under the access to justice theory
because it is an essential component of both the attorney’s and
the client’s ability to invoke or avoid government power in a
manner that will protect the rights and interests of a specific
group or cause.
In fact, cause lawyering was expressly recognized as being
protected by the lawyer’s core First Amendment rights to
association, political expression, and petitioning in NAACP v.
Button itself.182 These rights are not limited to representing
“underserved populations,” as Model Rule 8.4(g) attempts to
confine them. The Button court emphasized that the fact that
the NAACP was “engaged in activities of expression and
association on behalf of the rights of [African-American] children”
was “constitutionally irrelevant to the ground of our decision.”183
Instead, the court expressly held that lawyers representing the
opposite viewpoints would be equally protected in their First
Amendment rights of expression, association, and petition: “The
180
181
182
183

ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g)(4) (2019) (emphasis added).
See TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 272–75.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438–39 (1963).
Id. at 444 (emphasis added).
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course of our decisions in the First Amendment area makes plain
that its protections would apply as fully to those who would
arouse our society against the objectives” of the NAACP.184 The
Maine Rule correctly allows all private lawyers—along with the
full breadth of the political spectrum—their constitutional
political freedom to focus their practice to a particular cause or
clientele.
5.

Clarifying Freedom to Decline

The Maine Rule also straightforwardly states that
“[d]eclining representation” is “not regulated by Rule 8.4(g).”185
Model Rule 8.4(g) was rather muddled on this issue. On the one
hand, Model Rule 8.4(g) expressly states that it “does not limit
the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16.”186 Yet, on the other
hand, comment 5 indicates that the rule only allows lawyers to
limit their practices to a specific clientele if that clientele is an
“underserved population[ ].”187 Moreover, while Rule 1.16 fully
addresses when a lawyer is both required or permitted to
withdraw from an ongoing representation, the Rule simply does
not address when a lawyer is permitted to decline a case at the
outset.188
Historically, private lawyers have been absolutely free to
decline any representation they wish to reject for any or no
reason, and the ABA’s Report states that Rule 8.4(g) “does not
change the circumstances under which a lawyer may accept,
decline or withdraw from a representation.”189 The Report thus
indicates that even under Model Rule 8.4(g), lawyers retain their
complete autonomy to decline cases.
Nevertheless, Stephen Gillers—a leading defender of Rule
8.4(g)—reads comment 5 to create a limitation on declination
through negative implication. Comment 5 states that “[a] lawyer
does not violate paragraph (g) . . . by limiting the lawyer’s practice
to members of underserved populations in accordance with these
Rules and other law,” which Gillers interprets to mean that
lawyers are in violation of the Rule if they decline
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id. (emphasis added).
ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g)(4) (2019).
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
Id., cmt. 5.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
ABA REPORT 109, supra note 6, at 8 (emphasis added).
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representations on one of the enumerated bases unless limiting
their practice to an “underserved population[ ].”190 Similarly,
Ronald Rotunda expressed his concern that the Rule was unclear
about lawyers’ freedom to decline cases—since it allows for
declinations “in accordance with Rule 1.16”—a rule that simply
does not address declination at all.191
Whatever one thinks about the private lawyer’s historic right
to decline cases for any or no reason, the Maine Rule is certainly
an improvement over Model Rule 8.4(g) in clarity on the issue.
Given that both defenders, like Gillers, and detractors, like
Rotunda, amplify the Rule’s inherent ambiguity surrounding
permissible declinations, attorneys and regulators will similarly
be unsure of the Rule’s scope, which may lead to inequitable or
selective enforcement.
Maine avoids the foray entirely;
declination is simply not regulated by Maine’s Rule. Moreover,
consistent with both lawyer and client First Amendment rights
expounded in Button, Maine’s Rule correctly protects all cause
lawyering and not solely that which assists underserved
populations.
As I have explained elsewhere,192 Model Rule 8.4(g) redefines
professional discipline for all attorneys in both private and
government practice. But a different constitutional balance
exists for those who are publicly employed than for private
attorneys.193 Publicly-employed attorneys, such as prosecutors
and judges, can—and should—be prohibited from declining to
represent or otherwise assist people based on their race, sex,
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, etc. That is
precisely because by accepting public employment or office, they
have already selected the one client that they actually represent:
the government. As the agent and fiduciary of the government
itself, the attorney must act impartially and provide justice to
all—without bias. As the Supreme Court famously explained in

190

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(emphasis added). In a similar vein, comment 4 expressly allows lawyers to “engage
in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without violating this
Rule.” Id., cmt. 4.
191
Using the Licensing Power of the Administrative State: Model Rule 8.4(g),
supra note 138, at 40 n.66 (statement of Ronald Rotunda) (citing MODEL RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)).
192
See TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 275–76.
193
Formal Opinion 493 conflates this problem. In shoring up the legitimacy of
Model Rule 8.4(g), the Opinion cites to the rules governing judges, prosecutors, and
other publicly-employed attorneys. See ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 3 nn.7–8.
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Berger v. United States, the publicly-employed lawyer represents
a sovereign whose “obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all.”194 Nevertheless, the
private lawyer is not under the same obligation as the public
lawyer to act impartially. Instead, private lawyers are hired
precisely to be partial in their commitment to their client’s cause.
6.

Providing Interpretive Guidance

Finally, although not in Maine’s Rule itself, a “Guidance”
note accompanies the passage of Maine’s 8.4(g) to explain that
the Rule is not to be used to punish minor and unintentional
conduct. It explains that “the extent of enforcement or initiation
of formal disciplinary proceedings will depend on the level of
intentionality and seriousness of the reported violation.”195
Further, the court emphasizes:
Response to complaints and disciplinary actions initiated under
the new Rule 8.4(g), as with disciplinary actions under the
present Maine Rules of Professional Conduct, will be subject to
similar reasonable and measured enforcement choices,
particularly as experience with the new Rule and Continuing
Legal Education programs promote better understanding within
the Maine legal community of ethical obligations to achieve
compliance with the Rule.196

In like manner, the New Hampshire Rule includes a Supreme
Court comment emphasizing that “[t]he rule requires that the
proscribed action be taken with the primary purpose of
embarrassing, harassing or burdening another person” and “does
not prohibit conduct that lacks this primary purpose, even if the
conduct incidentally produces, or has the effect or impact of
producing, the described result.”197
Certainly, protection of First Amendment rights is not to be
left to the “good graces” of any regulators. Unconstitutionally
broad regulations are not rendered constitutionally sound simply
by arguing that regulators can be trusted to exercise restraint in
enforcement.198
Nevertheless,
the
Guidance
section
194

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 guidance (2019) (emphasis added).
196
Id. (emphasis added).
197
N.H. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) Sup. Ct. cmt. (2019) (emphasis
added).
198
See, e.g., Greenberg v. Haggerty, Civ. Action No. 20-3822, 2020 WL 7227251,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2020) (“Defendants effectively ask Plaintiff to trust them not
to regulate and discipline his offensive speech even though they have given
195
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accompanying the Maine Rule is a reminder to both attorneys
and those in the state disciplinary commission that enforcement
should be reasonable and measured, taking into account the
offender’s intentionality and the seriousness of the conduct or
communication.
In the context of workplace harassment,
harassing speech, as opposed to physical contact, must be “severe
or pervasive“ such that it creates a hostile work environment. As
the U.S. Supreme Court explained regarding verbal workplace
harassment in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, “[a] recurring
point in these opinions is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will
not amount to” actionable harassment or discrimination.199
Although the Maine Rule does not expressly impose a “severe or
pervasive” requirement, it does expressly and substantially limit
what can constitute discriminatory speech, and further indicates
in the Guidance section that “the extent of enforcement or
initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings” is dependent on
both seriousness—severity—and intentionality.200
B.

The Significance of Preexisting State Antidiscrimination
Rules

Commentators who favor Model Rule 8.4(g) often point to the
preexisting state antidiscrimination rules or comments as
demonstrating that Model Rule 8.4(g) is, and must be,
constitutionally sound. But, the existence of such rules actually
highlights the constitutional deficiencies of Model Rule 8.4(g)
rather than demonstrates its constitutionality.
Initially, the major problem with the argument that Model
Rule 8.4(g) is validated by pre-existing state rules is that they
simply are not comparable in substance or scope. Gillers himself
recognizes and catalogs the significant differences between Model
Rule 8.4(g) and the existing antidiscrimination rules found in

themselves the authority to do so. So, despite asking Plaintiff to trust them, there
remains the constant threat that the Rule will be engaged as the plain language of it
says it will be engaged.”).
199
524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998) (citations omitted); see also Blackman, supra
note 7, at 245 & n.16 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88). Notably, ABA Formal
Opinion 493 expressly disavows a “severe or pervasive” standard, repeatedly
asserting that a single epithet, derogatory sexual comment, etc., can violate Model
Rule 8.4(g) even though it would not violate federal antidiscrimination laws. See
ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 1, 4, 8.
200
ME. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 guidance (2019).
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various states.201 These differences include, for example, that
most of the pre-existing rules “contain the nexus ‘in the course of
representing a client’ or its equivalent” and “tie the forbidden
conduct to a lawyer’s work in connection with the ‘administration
of justice’ or, more specifically, to a matter before a tribunal.”202
He further notes:
Six jurisdictions’ rules require that forbidden conduct be done
“knowingly,” “intentionally,” or “willfully.” Four jurisdictions
limit the scope of their rules to conduct that violates federal or
state anti-discrimination laws . . . . Only four jurisdictions use
the word “harass” or variations in their rules. [And,] [i]n twelve
states, anti-bias language appears in a comment only . . . .203

In other words, the existing antidiscrimination rules are simply
not analogous to the Model Rule. Further, the fact that a
narrowly tailored rule is constitutional does not make all other
rules addressing that same subject matter constitutional,
regardless of scope or breadth. Again, as explained in Button,
“[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone,” while “[b]road
prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect.”204
Whether a given rule is constitutionally sound depends entirely
on the precise prohibitions and scope of that specific rule.
Overall, the pre-existing state rules are far more circumscribed
than Model Rule 8.4(g). Some are limited in scope to bias
occurring before a court or when representing a client, many are
limited by requiring that discrimination be willful or knowing,
and others require that the conduct violate federal or state
antidiscrimination laws.
Thus, the lack of constitutional
objections to these rules tells us nothing about the
constitutionality of Model Rule 8.4(g) because Model Rule 8.4(g)
contains none of these narrowing attributes.
Nevertheless, the existence of these state antidiscrimination
rules and comments does have significance in the debate
surrounding Model Rule 8.4(g).
Notably, only two states,
Vermont and New Mexico, have adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) as
promulgated, and a substantial contingent have rejected it.205 In
the four years since its promulgation, the Model Rule has had
201

Gillers, supra note 49, at 208–09.
Id. at 208.
203
Id. (footnotes omitted).
204
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (emphasis added).
205
VT. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017); N.M. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT
r. 16-804(G) (2019); JURISDICTIONAL ADOPTION OF RULE 8.4(G), supra note 120.
202
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very little traction. But the fact that a significant contingent of
states have existing antidiscrimination and antiharassment rules
demonstrates that state bars and judiciaries are not opposed to
passing such measures. Indeed, the existence of these rules in so
many states condemns Model Rule 8.4(g) more than it validates
it. States are rejecting Model Rule 8.4(g) not because they are
oblivious to the problems of harassment and discrimination or
opposed to equality and diversity. They are rejecting it because a
fair reading of the Rule as promulgated by the ABA encroaches
into the First Amendment rights of lawyers. Even if not
enforced, a state should not pass Model Rule 8.4(g) for “symbolic”
purposes because lawyers will still be chilled by the breadth of
rule. As the Button court explained in the context of prohibitions
on attorney speech, association, and petitioning: “The threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions.”206 Moreover, as emphasized in
its Formal Opinion 493, the ABA is not proffering Model Rule
8.4(g) to the states as a symbolic or aspirational rule; instead,
Opinion 493 asserts that “[e]nforcement of Rule 8.4(g)
is . . . critical . . . .”207
The other significant point to be made from these rules and
comments is that constitutionally sound and appropriately
limited antidiscrimination and antiharassment rules can and
have been drafted in a number of states. Like Maine’s and New
Hampshire’s recent 8.4(g) rules, these provisions in the aggregate
show that regulators need not make a Scylla and Charybdis
choice between anti-harassment/discrimination and the First
Amendment but can draft appropriately tailored and
constitutionally sound rules.
C.

The Path Forward

So, what should be done? First, defenders of Model Rule
8.4(g) should stop defending this rule—especially if the defense
includes an abdication or denial of lawyers’ First Amendment
rights. Lawyers have protectable First Amendment rights. It is
a fact, supported by over a dozen U.S. Supreme Court cases
striking down regulation or punishment of lawyers as violative of
their First Amendment rights.208 To these defenders I implore:

206
207
208

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 1.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Do not betray the civil rights, antiwar, labor union, communistsympathetic and other unpopular-for-their-time lawyers who
went before you and established by both word and deed that
lawyers have and need First Amendment rights, including,
specifically, protection from regulation and disbarment by the
state bar and judiciary.
Second, instead of defending Model Rule 8.4(g) as
promulgated, why cannot the ABA simply own that it drafted a
rule that, while very well intentioned, has been interpreted or
understood by numerous states reviewing it to exceed the
constitutional limits of lawyer regulation? ABA Formal Opinion
493 does very little to help in this regard—it contains only one
helpful sentence asserting that “[t]he Rule does not prevent a
lawyer from . . . expressing opinions and ideas on matters of
public concern.”209 The Opinion does nothing to change the
extremely broad and constitutionally problematic text of the
Rule—let alone the other deficiencies noted above that are
addressed by the Maine and New Hampshire rules. In fact, the
Opinion is largely devoted to insisting on the legitimacy of the
Rule as promulgated—by justifying the modern need to curb
lawyer discrimination and harassment to “maintain[ ] the
public’s confidence in the impartiality of the legal system,”210 and
by asserting that there are no constitutional problems with the
rule, in part by denying lawyer access to the First Amendment by
asserting the constitutional conditions approach and by
contending at length that lawyers can be subjected to vague and
Doubling down instead of fixing the
overbroad laws.211
constitutional deficiencies is not the appropriate path and will
continue to widen the cultural divide rather than build a path
forward. The path forward is clear. The ABA should redraft a
Model Rule that has the limitations exemplified by Maine’s or
New Hampshire’s rules, outlined above, or otherwise narrow
Model Rule 8.4(g) so that it is constitutionally sound.
Such a path forward would not just be “eating humble pie”—
it is the only way to effectively reach the ABA’s goal of curbing
harassment and discrimination. No matter the good intentions
of those involved in drafting 8.4(g), the Rule has significant
constitutional defects. These defects have kept the rule from
being enacted in jurisdictions—and even leading one state to
209
210
211

ABA Op. 493, supra note 13, at 1.
Id. at 1; see also id. at 1–5.
See id. at 9–11.
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legislatively foreclose its enactment and to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to temporarily enjoin the Pennsylvania rule
pending a constitutional challenge. In turn, because of its lack of
traction and susceptibility to constitutional challenge, the Model
Rule in large part fails to do anything to effectively curb lawyer
discrimination or harassment.
But it is not just that Model Rule 8.4(g) fails to produce
beneficial results due to its lack of traction; it instead has
brought about significant detrimental byproducts. The first, as
expounded fully above, is the abandoning of lawyer First
Amendment rights by defenders of the Rule—a reckless course
that can easily work to undermine these essential rights in other
disciplinary and regulatory contexts. And second, precisely
because Model Rule 8.4(g) can readily be interpreted to foreclose
or punish political speech on controversial hot-button issues—
with foreclosure leaned heavily towards speech in favor of
conservative and traditional views—the continued defense of the
rule by the ABA and others only serves to stoke the culture war.
Because of the Rule’s lack of traction, the defense of the Rule
does not promote diversity or equality—it does not curb
harassment or discrimination. It only stirs the pot, agitates, and
widens the already too-wide divide between liberals and
conservatives in this country. Both sides become heated in a
showdown between diversity and the First Amendment, with
each side feeding off righteous indignation for the value they
selected in this false dichotomy.
But a narrower rule, one like Maine’s or New Hampshire’s
that could not be readily construed to reach into political speech
or expressions of conservative or traditional policy viewpoints,
would actually be far more likely to be adopted by states—many
of which have previously enacted similar rules or comments. A
narrower rule would be far more likely to remain law after
enactment, instead of being challenged or enjoined as
unconstitutional, and—most importantly for defenders of Model
Rule 8.4(g)—it would therefore actually work to curb harassment
and discrimination.
CONCLUSION
The false dichotomy created by the ABA’s Model Rule 8.4(g)
has compelled people to choose sides in a clash between
antidiscrimination and the First Amendment. In a new body of
scholarship, defenders of the Rule have revived the constitutional
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conditions theory to their aid—renouncing lawyer First
Amendment rights as a protection against professional
regulation. Thus, the ominous shadow cast by Rule 8.4(g) is
nothing less than the surrender of lawyer First Amendment
rights. How far will this shadow reach? To what other
regulatory and disciplinary contexts?
To justify the
promulgation of what other regulations, prohibitions, and
punishments? Once the First Amendment is discarded as a
roadblock to professional regulation and punishment, what
happens when political power changes hands? Can lawyers just
trust state bars to govern fairly once they are freed from
constitutional constraint? Can lawyers trust them not to take
aim at the unpopular? Given our long national history of
punishing and disbarring lawyers who took unpopular stances,
held unpopular views, or represented the unpopular212—”trust”
cannot be the answer.
Yet, rest assured that this body of scholarship, written to
shore up the alleged constitutionality of Model Rule 8.4(g), will
be employed to justify punishment or regulation in other
contexts. It can be used whenever lawyers argue that they are
being disciplined in violation of their First Amendment rights of
speech, association, or petitioning—which inevitably will occur
when what the lawyer is saying, with whom the lawyer
associates, as clients, or when the cause for which the lawyer is
petitioning is unpopular. That is because, as Zechariah Chafee
observed, the First Amendment is really only necessary to
protect “unpopular sentiments or persons” because the powersthat-be naturally protect the popular.213 Further, the extent of
lawyers’ “rights” will become entirely dependent on the political
views of whichever parties or persons happen to be in political
control—both at the local state bar level as well as at the
national ABA level. Again, as Chafee explained, “once force is
thrown into the argument, it becomes a matter of chance whether
it is thrown on the false side or the true.”214
It is nothing short of reckless to abandon the First
Amendment rights of lawyers. Such a renunciation has farreaching effects.
The shadow looms large—far beyond
undermining the individual lawyer’s personal exercise of
constitutional rights. That is because “the First Amendment
212
213
214

See, e.g., supra notes 27–29, 91–94 and accompanying text.
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 3 (1920).
Id. at 34.
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rights of lawyers, when properly defined, protect the integrity of
It is through lawyer speech,
the justice system itself.”215
association, and petitioning that individuals and associations
throughout the nation are able to invoke and avoid government
power in protection of their life, liberty, and property. It is
through lawyers exercising these First Amendment rights that
the judicial power is invoked, and thus enabled to redress
grievances and secure legal rights.216 It is through lawyer
speech, association, and petitioning that political, economic, and
institutional power can be checked.217 It is reckless to abandon
the First Amendment rights of lawyers precisely because the
structure of our justice system depends on the exercise of those
rights.218
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TARKINGTON, supra note 4, at 1.
“An informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent
bar.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001).
217
See supra Part III.
218
Cf. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 90, at 48 (explaining that if the First
Amendment “means anything, it means that certain substantive evils which, in
principle, [regulators have] a right to prevent, must be endured if the only way of
avoiding them is by the abridging of that freedom of speech upon which the entire
structure of our free institutions rests”).
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